Author Archives: hksar gov

     Following is a question by Professor the Hon Alex Fan and a reply by the Under Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Mr Joseph Chan, in the Legislative Council today (October 21):
 
Question:
 
     It is learnt that in a number of money laundering cases in recent years, the account holders involved (including foreign domestic helpers and elderly persons) claimed that their bank accounts were opened via mobile applications without their knowledge and used as stooge accounts, where lawbreakers typically first obtain victims’ identity cards and personal data, enter the information into bank mobile applications without authorisation, register and link the accounts with mobile phone numbers prepared in advance, and then deceive the victims into “taking photos” on screens lacking prompts to pass facial recognition verification. Once the accounts have been opened, the lawbreakers immediately receive one-time passwords via the linked numbers to carry out money laundering transactions. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
 
(1) whether the Hong Kong Monetary Authority will require banks to clearly display the words “bank” and “account opening application” on the facial recognition screens for online account opening, and to remind the applicants in a familiar language that they are opening an account;
 
(2) given that the Real-name Registration Programme for Subscriber Identification Module Cards was fully implemented in 2023, whether the Government will mandate banks to verify that the mobile phone numbers used by applicants for account registration and linkage are under the names of the applicants or their specified relatives; if not, of the reasons for that; and
 
(3) whether the Government will empower banks to access the real-name registration data, so as to verify that the registered users of the linked numbers are the applicants or their specified relatives; if not, of the reasons for that?

Reply:
 
President,
 
     The Government attaches great importance to preventing the illicit opening of bank accounts, and is particularly concerned about the risk of fraudsters stealing others’ identities to open bank accounts remotely. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) has set out relevant regulatory requirements and provided guidance to banks, requiring them to implement appropriate identity verification and risk management measures for remote account opening. Banks are also required to continuously review and enhance their systems and controls to protect bank customers, while preventing bank accounts (including those opened through illicit means) from being used as stooge accounts to receive, transfer, or launder crime proceeds.
 
     Having consulted the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau and the HKMA, my reply to the three parts of the question is as follows:
 
(1) The HKMA has maintained continuous supervision of the banking sector, requiring banks to put in place multi-layered controls to verify customers’ identities and prevent fraud. The HKMA also shares the latest modus operandi of fraudsters with banks to help the industry defend against fraud. When processing account opening applications, banks must effectively identify and verify customer identities, such as using technology solutions to verify the authenticity of identity cards and using facial recognition technology to confirm that the customer is the holder of the identity card. At the same time, banks must continuously improve these technological solutions to address evolving fraud tactics. After bank accounts are opened, ongoing due diligence and transaction monitoring must also be conducted, with suspicious transactions reported to law enforcement agencies to assist their investigations.
 
     To address scams involving bank accounts being opened without customers’ knowledge, the HKMA issued further guidance to banks in 2023 reminding them to adopt appropriate measures during remote account opening process. These include displaying clear on-screen messages to remind customers that the selfies collected or liveness tests being conducted are for account opening purposes, so that customers are aware that they are undergoing the relevant procedures.
 
(2) and (3) Under the existing regulatory framework, regulated financial institutions (including banks) must establish effective and appropriate anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism controls, covering customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, and suspicious transaction reporting.
 
     In fact, to address the potential risks associated with bank customers using SMS One-Time Passwords (OTPs) for transaction authentication, banks have implemented “In-app Authentication” in accordance with the HKMA’s requirements. For customers who have installed a bank’s mobile application on their mobile phones, they are required to authenticate via that mobile application when logging into internet banking and conducting high-risk transactions (such as adding new payees, raising transfer limits, or changing the phone number for receiving bank messages). This helps reduce the risk of fraudsters stealing internet banking login credentials and SMS OTPs to carry out unauthorised transfers. In addition, when binding their internet banking accounts to mobile devices, customers are also required to complete facial recognition, reducing the reliance on SMS OTPs.
 
     Currently, under the Real-name Registration Programme for SIM cards, users’ registration data are collected and kept by the systems and databases established by the respective telecommunications operators. Pursuant to sections 12 and 13 of the Telecommunications (Registration of SIM Cards) Regulation (Cap. 106AI) (the Regulation), telecommunications operators are only authorised to provide user records to law enforcement officers of designated agencies for the purpose of investigating or preventing crimes. The Regulation does not authorise other organisations (including banks) to access the user registration data under the Real-name Registration Programme. As banks are progressively reducing their reliance on SMS OTPs as required by the HKMA, the Government currently has no plans to authorise banks to access the user registration data of the Real-name Registration Programme.
 
     Nevertheless, in respect of the more common criminal modus operandi and emerging risks relating to the use of stolen identities for remote opening of bank accounts, the Government has, through cross-departmental collaboration, jointly launched a series of countermeasures together with the banking sector.
 
     Among them, the HKMA announced in August 2025 new measures to enhance internet banking security, namely “e-Banking Security ABCD”, and through the “Deepfake Detection” measure therein, shared with banks good practices for defending against deepfake attacks. These good practices apply to all processes involving facial recognition, including remote account opening applications and high-risk online transactions.
 
     Furthermore, the HKMA is working closely with the Digital Policy Office and the banking sector to progressively integrate the Step-up Authentication function of “iAM Smart” into critical processes. Leveraging the function to conduct facial recognition and read identity card chips can prevent fraudsters from using fake or stolen identity documents. This will provide another layer of protection to the customer identity authentication process. The first phase of testing for remote account opening has already commenced. The HKMA will assess the security, stability, and customer experience of the overall process and gradually expand it to other business areas on a risk-based approach. We expect this measure to further combat crimes involving account opening with stolen identities.
 
     The Government will continue to monitor the risks and relevant trends associated with remote opening of bank accounts, as well as review and optimise countermeasures, so as to better protect the property of the general public and mitigate potential money laundering risks.
 
     Thank you, President. read more

     Following is a question by Dr the Hon Hoey Simon Lee and a written reply by the Secretary for Health, Professor Lo Chung-mau, in the Legislative Council today (October 21):
     
Question:

     There are views that with the accelerated development of healthcare integration in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, a number of advertisements placed by non-local medical institutions have appeared on the local market and online platforms. However, some advertisements vary in the standards of disclosure concerning service efficacy and risks, and members of the public may face issues relating to consumer or medical rights and interests when seeking medical consultations outside Hong Kong based on such information, which may even pose potential safety hazards. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
     
(1) of the respective numbers of advertisements involving non-local healthcare services screened by the Department of Health and the Customs and Excise Department over the past three years; among such cases, the number of those prosecuted for suspected contravention of the Undesirable Medical Advertisements Ordinance (Cap. 231) or the Trade Descriptions Ordinance (Cap. 362);

(2) as there are views that while locally registered healthcare personnel, bound by the Medical Council of Hong Kong’s Code of Professional Conduct or the Dental Council of Hong Kong’s Code of Professional Discipline, are in principle prohibited from soliciting business through advertising, non-local institutions are not subject to such ethical restrictions, resulting in discrepancies in marketing regulations between the two, whether the Government will review the application of existing legislation to non-local medical advertisements and optimise the regulatory mechanism; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

(3) given that the country’s Measures for the Administration of Medical Advertisements apply only to advertisements within the Mainland and do not directly regulate Mainland institutions’ marketing in Hong Kong, whether the Government will establish interface and notification mechanisms with relevant Mainland authorities (e.g. the State Administration for Market Regulation or the National Health Commission) to jointly regulate cross-boundary marketing; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

(4) as there are views that the healthcare regulatory systems of Hong Kong and the Mainland are independent of each other, and members of the public seeking cross-boundary medical consultations may find it difficult to seek assistance should they encounter issues relating to consumer or medical rights and interests, whether the Government will explore with relevant Mainland authorities the establishment of a case referral or interface mechanism for cross-boundary medical disputes, and provide members of the public with clear guidelines on protecting rights and interests in cross-boundary medical care; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that; and

(5) of the specific measures in place to step up the provision of objective medical risk alerts, information guidelines as well as health education and publicity to members of the public who wish to seek medical consultations outside Hong Kong?

Reply:

President,

     In response to Dr the Hon Hoey Simon Lee’s question, the consolidated reply to parts (1) to (5) of the question after consultation with the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau and the Department of Health (DH) is as follows:

     Medical services are a matter of life and health for the public. Hong Kong has a comprehensive regulatory system in place to ensure that members of the public can obtain appropriate and quality professional medical services in Hong Kong. 

     All healthcare professionals under statutory regulation in Hong Kong must comply with the relevant registration ordinances and the codes of professional conduct formulated by the relevant statutory boards and councils of the professions. These boards and councils generally require in their codes that registered persons maintain accuracy, objectivity and impartiality when providing medical information or services, without exaggerating or making misleading statements, nor soliciting patients or engaging in commercial promotion. In the event of breach of the codes, the relevant boards and councils may initiate disciplinary proceedings to uphold professional integrity and public trust.

     In addition, to prevent members of the public from seeking improper treatment for certain health conditions and thereby delaying proper diagnosis and treatment, the Undesirable Medical Advertisements Ordinance (Cap. 231) prohibits or restricts the publication of advertisements likely to lead to the use of any medicine, surgical appliance or treatment for the purpose of preventing or treating the diseases or conditions specified in Schedules 1 and 2 to Cap. 231 (including any benign or malignant tumour, parasitic disease or respiratory illness). The Undesirable Medical Advertisements Ordinance also prohibits or restricts the making of the six groups of claims specified in Schedule 4 (including regulating blood sugar or glucose, blood pressure, blood lipids or cholesterol) in advertisements for orally consumed products. 

     At present, all advertisements published in Hong Kong, irrespective of whether the medical services to which their contents relate are provided locally or outside Hong Kong, must comply with the Undesirable Medical Advertisements Ordinance. The DH has all along been actively screening medical advertisements published in Hong Kong, which includes advertisements that promote medical services outside Hong Kong. From January 2023 to September 2026, the DH reviewed over 150 000 advertisements published across various media in Hong Kong (including newspapers, magazines, leaflets, signs, posters, as well as radio, television and internet), and issued over 1 600 warning letters concerning advertisements suspected of contravening Cap. 231. Among them, there were nine warning letters related to advertisements promoting medical services outside Hong Kong. The concerned advertisements have all been removed upon the issuance of warning letters by the DH. For cases where the relevant advertisement contents are still not removed or deleted upon receipt of warning letters, the DH will initiate prosecution proceedings based on its mechanism. Upon first conviction, an offender is liable to a fine of $50,000 and imprisonment for six months; upon a subsequent conviction for the same offence, an offender is liable to a fine of $100,000 and imprisonment for one year. Furthermore, if the promotion of services to consumers in Hong Kong involves unfair trade practices such as false trade descriptions, misleading omissions or bait advertising, Hong Kong Customs may follow up under the Trade Descriptions Ordinance (Cap. 362). The Trade Descriptions Ordinance does not apply to services not provided in Hong Kong. 

     The Government will from time to time examine the scope and enforcement of the Undesirable Medical Advertisements Ordinance, and study whether there is a need to further optimise the provisions with a view to more effectively regulating medical advertisements. In the course of the examination, the Government will make reference to the regulatory experience of other places and take into account the views of the trade and the community, and has to carefully balance a range of considerations at the same time, including the need to protect public health, the right of members of the public to access information, as well as the proportionality and enforceability of regulatory measures.

     Where to receive medical services is a personal choice. Hong Kong residents may elect to receive medical services outside Hong Kong, and non-Hong Kong residents may also elect to come to Hong Kong for consultation and treatment. Irrespective of where patients come from, medical services provided in Hong Kong must comply with the laws and professional regulatory requirements of Hong Kong. On the other hand, medical services provided outside Hong Kong are regulated by the local regulatory authorities in accordance with the local laws and regulations. If members of the public elect to receive medical services outside Hong Kong, they should take note of the relevant local regulations and fully understand the necessity, risks, follow-up arrangements and total costs of the treatment, and retain relevant documents such as medical history, bills and written consent.

     The DH has established liaison and notification mechanisms with the relevant Mainland authorities to exchange information on irregularities and, where necessary, to notify individual cases, so that both places can take follow-up action in accordance with the law within the respective purviews.

     As regards consumer disputes, the Consumer Council has established a mechanism for referral of cross-boundary complaints through signing Memoranda of Understanding with consumer protection bodies of other places, including Macao and more than 30 Chinese Mainland provinces and cities. Upon receiving a complaint regarding cross-boundary consumption, the Council will refer the case to the relevant consumer protection body for follow-up as per established practice. The Council will continue to work with consumer protection bodies on the Mainland to strengthen public education work, with a view to helping consumers from both places gain deeper understanding on the matters to be aware of when engaging in cross-boundary consumption, as well as the current referral mechanism for cross-boundary complaints. read more

     The Civil Engineering and Development Department (CEDD) and the Nanjing University of Science and Technology (NJUST) signed a three-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in Nanjing today (October 21) to enhance collaboration in the fields of civil explosives and safe blasting technologies.

     The MOU was jointly signed by the Director of Civil Engineering and Development and the Commissioner of Mines, Mr Michael Fong, and the President of the NJUST, Professor Yang Yixin. The scope of co-operation covers personnel training, technical exchanges, and the promotion of research, development, and application of frontier technologies, with a view to enhancing the safety and efficiency of blasting operations in infrastructure projects.

     Speaking at the signing ceremony, Mr Fong expressed his hope that deepening co-operation would further enhance the professional capabilities of frontline regulatory and operational personnel. He added that the collaboration will drive the digital and intelligent development of civil explosives technology and management, thereby providing efficient and safe technical support for works projects such as those in the Northern Metropolis, while assisting in promoting the country’s advanced civil explosives technologies to overseas markets.

     Professor Yang stated that the civil explosives field is continuously advancing towards safe development and high-quality development in accordance with the National 15th Five-Year Plan. Capitalising on its research experience and technological edge in frontier blasting safety, the NJUST will combine its expertise with the engineering practice and practical applications of the CEDD to achieve in-depth synergy.

     The NJUST is a national key university affiliated with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. Many of its research achievements in fields such as chemistry, chemical engineering, and energetic materials hold leading positions both domestically and internationally. The university houses the China National Quality Inspection and Testing Center for Industrial Explosive Materials, which is a recognised national-level statutory inspection agency.

read more

     Following is a question by the Hon Chau Siu-chung and a written reply by the Secretary for Security, Mr Tang Ping-keung, in the Legislative Council today (October 21):

Question:
 
     Regarding the manpower in the security services industry and the importation of security practitioners, will the Government inform this Council:
 
(1) of the numbers of persons employed to perform security work in each of the past three years and this year to date, with a breakdown by the type of security work they did (i.e. Category A, B, C and D security work);
 
(2) of the current number of valid Security Personnel Permit (SPP) holders, with a breakdown by the age group of the holders and the category of SPPs they hold;
 
(3) of the respective numbers of SPPs issued by the Police Licensing Office of the Police Force to new applicants in each of the past three years and this year to date, with a breakdown by the age group of the applicants;
 
(4) from the introduction of the Enhanced Supplementary Labour Scheme (ESLS) on September 4, 2023 to the announcement of the review findings and enhanced measures of ESLS on June 15, 2026 by the Government, and from June 16, 2026 to the present, of the respective numbers of applications for the importation of security personnel received, approved and rejected under ESLS by the authorities each month, with a breakdown by the category of security work to which the posts belong; among the aforesaid approved cases, of the number of imported workers who have arrived in Hong Kong; and
 
(5) as some members of the industry have pointed out that the relaxation under ESLS allowing imported workers to work at business locations in no more than five districts has substantially enhanced employers’ flexibility in work arrangements, which may encourage security and property management companies to apply more actively for the importation of security practitioners, of the measures put in place by the authorities to ensure the employment priority for local workers, including whether they will consider establishing a mechanism whereby a job category will be included in a more stringent Tier 2 vetting mechanism under ESLS if its imported workers exceed a certain proportion of the total number of practitioners; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that?
 
Reply:
 
President,
 
     According to the Security and Guarding Services Ordinance (Cap. 460) (the Ordinance) , the Security and Guarding Services Industry Authority is responsible for formulating issuing criteria and conditions for security personnel permits (SPPs), while the Police Licensing Office (PLO) is responsible for issuing SPPs to individuals performing security work.
      
     At present, SPPs are classified into four categories, namely A, B, C and D, according to different types of security work. Category A is applicable to guarding work provided for a single private residential building which does not require the carrying of arms and ammunition; Category B is applicable to guarding work provided for any persons, premises or properties which does not require the carrying of arms and ammunition; Category C is applicable to guarding work which requires the carrying of arms and ammunition; and Category D is applicable to the installation, maintenance and repairing of a security device, or the designing of a system incorporating a security device for any particular premises or place.
      
     Having consulted the Labour and Welfare Bureau, the reply to the question raised by the Hon Chau Siu-chung is as follows:
 
(1) and (2) The number and age distribution of security personnel currently holding valid SPPs (i.e. SPPs of Category A, B, C or D) are set out in Table 1.
 
Table 1: Current number and age distribution of holders of various categories of SPPs
 

Age	SPP Category				Total@
	A	B*	C^	D
18-20	3 767	3 764	7	8	3 775
21-30	25 765	25 751	194	550	26 273
31-40	31 036	31 021	308	1 429	32 334
41-50	57 114	57 082	255	2 103	58 991
51-60	108 962	108 933	143	2 005	110 697
61-70	115 523	109 162	–	1 049	116 309
71-80	19 213	–	–	98	19 290
Above 80	946	–	–	2	949
Total	362 326	335 713	907	7 244	368 618

@ Some SPP holders may simultaneously hold SPPs of more than one category.
* The upper age limit for performing Category B security work is 70.
^ The upper age limit for performing Category C security work is 60.
 
     The number of security personnel holding valid SPPs and employed to perform security work (including full-time, part-time and temporary positions) over the past three years and this year (up to September) is set out in Table 2. Regarding employed personnel, the PLO does not maintain statistics broken down by type of security work (i.e. Categories A, B, C or D) or age group.
 
Table 2: Number of persons employed to perform security work@
 

Year	Total
2023	155 599
2024	160 970
2025	160 292
2026 (up to September)	161 399

@ According to section 13 of the Ordinance, a security company or an employer of security personnel shall, within 14 days after the commencement/termination of the employment, give written notice to the Commissioner of Police of the names of the employees and of the date on which the employment commenced/ceased. The PLO has compiled the statistics based on the information collected.
 
(3) The number and age distribution of new applicants issued with SPPs by the PLO in the past three years and this year (up to September) are set out in Table 3.
 
Table 3: Number and age distribution of new applicants issued with SPPs
 

Age	Year
	2023	2024	2025	2026 (up to September)
18 – 20	1 260	1 622	2 160	2 373
21 – 30	4 194	5 293	6 362	5 761
31 – 40	4 996	5 857	7 287	5 611
41 – 50	10 352	11 557	13 964	9 521
51 – 60	15 987	18 184	22 917	16 553
61 – 70	9 940	11 601	15 428	11 344
71 – 80	597	590	768	1 497
Over 80	55	48	61	53
Total	47 381	54 752	68 947	52 713

(4) The Labour Department (LD) has implemented the Enhanced Supplementary Labour Scheme (ESLS) since September 4, 2023. Up to September 2026, applications for importing 17 742 security guards were received from employers, and approvals for importing 7 275 security guards were granted. The others involved applications of which the processing was discontinued (including applications withdrawn by employers, applications for which the employers failed to provide the required information, and those failing to pass the preliminary screening), applications under processing, applications that were not fully approved, etc. According to the statistics from the Immigration Department, as at August 2026, 2 736 imported security guards were working in Hong Kong under ESLS. The LD currently does not maintain the number of applications received and approved broken down by type of security work.
 
     The annual figures (including the monthly average) of imported security guards applied for and approved under ESLS from September 4, 2023 to September 2026 are set out in Table 4. The LD does not maintain the number of imported security guards under ESLS broken down by type of security work (i.e. Categories A, B, C or D).
 
Table 4: Number of imported security guards applied for and approved under ESLS@
 

Year	No. of imported security guards applied for*	Average no. of imported security guards applied for per month	No. of imported security guards approved*	Average no. of imported security guards approved per month
2023 (September to December)	1 851	463	0	0
2024	5 631	469	1 945	162
2025	6 753	563	3 039	253
2026 (January to June)	1 814	302	1 593	266
2026 (July to September)	1 693	564	698	233
Total	17 742	–	7 275	–

@ The classification of job categories may be subject to revisions upon verification of information from employers.
* The LD has implemented ESLS since September 4, 2023. The vetting of applications received during the above period may be completed thereafter, and hence the number of imported workers approved only reflects the results of some of the applications received during the same period.
 
(5) The Government has always been committed to ensuring employment priority for local workers, while allowing only employers facing genuine recruitment difficulties and shortages of local manpower to import labour after approval, on a limited scale. The Government stringently vets each application for labour importation. Employers are allowed to import labour only upon meeting the manning ratio requirements of local employees to imported workers, undertaking local recruitment thereby according priority to employing qualified local workers to fill job vacancies at a salary not lower than the median monthly wage of a comparable position in the market, and proving that vacancies cannot be filled by local workers.
 
     To further safeguard the employment priority for local workers, ESLS has implemented a tiered vetting mechanism. Job categories falling under the Tier 2 mechanism are subject to more stringent requirements in respect of manning ratio and local recruitment requirements, etc. The LD will continue to monitor the economic and labour market situation, the manpower supply and demand in relevant sector(s) and post(s), the application and vetting situations of ESLS, etc. If there is a need to tighten the vetting criteria for specific sector(s) and post(s) (including security guards), the LD will include relevant sector(s)/ operating section(s) in the Tier 2 vetting mechanism to ensure employment priority for local workers. read more

     Following is a question by the Hon Steven Ho and a written reply by the Secretary for Security, Mr Tang Ping-keung, in the Legislative Council today (October 21):
 
Question:
 
     In recent years, the Correctional Services Department (CSD) has been actively developing Smart Prison by introducing a number of innovative technological equipment such as smart wristbands and video analytic monitoring systems, with a view to enhancing the efficiency of resource management and the security level of prisons. However, concerns have been raised as to whether the development of Smart Prison will have an impact on the security of institutions and the actual effectiveness of technology investment, in the face of an increasing number of persons in custody (PICs) and possible manpower shortages arising from reductions in departmental expenditure. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
      
(1) of the relevant data for various correctional institutions (including prisons, correctional institutions and reception centres) for the past three financial years in accordance with the tables below, and how CSD assesses the current manpower pressure of various institutions:
 
(a) the average daily number of PICs/occupancy rate and the actual supervisory ratio of frontline staff to PICs for various institutions (set out in Table 1);
 
Table 1

Institution	Financial year	Gender of PICs	Average daily number of PICs	Occupancy rate (%)	Crowdedness	Actual supervisory ratio (frontline staff : PICs)
(i) Stanley Prison	2023-2024	Male			Normal/Crowded	1 :
		Female
	2024-2025	Male
		Female
	2025-2026	Male
		Female
(ii)……
(iii)……

(b) whether CSD has deleted or frozen frontline posts (e.g. Assistant Officers and Officers) and back-office administrative posts (set out in Table 2);
 
Table 2

Post	Year	Number of posts deleted or frozen (set out by gender)
(i) Assistant Officer	2023-2024
	2024-2025
	2025-2026
(ii)……
(iii)……

(c) the average monthly overtime hours of frontline staff in various institutions and the reasons for that (set out in Table 3);
 
Table 3

Financial year	Name of institution	Post	Establishment	Average monthly overtime hours per person (hours)	Total overtime hours in the month (hours)	Major reasons for overtime work/ remarks
2023-2024
2024-2025
2025-2026

(d) the number, gender, years of service and reasons for transfer of frontline staff (e.g. Assistant Officers and Officers) to other disciplined services or government departments (set out in Table 4);
 
Table 4

Post	Total number of transfer applications in the past three financial years	Years of service and proportion of headcount		Major reasons for transfer
		Years of service	Proportion (%)
(i) Assistant Officer		Less than 3 years
		3-5 years
		5-10 years
		Over 10 years
(ii)……
(iii)……

(2) whether the pass rates have increased after CSD relaxed the entry physical fitness test requirements and allowed second- and third-year university students to apply for departmental posts (set out figures by post and gender); of the wastage rate of newly recruited staff in the past year;
 
(3) of the types and quantities of technological equipment mainly used in various correctional institutions, the breakdown and repair conditions, as well as the alternative arrangements during repair over the past three financial years (set out in Table 5), and how CSD assesses the effectiveness of technology investment; and
 
Table 5

Financial year	Institution	Type of technological equipment (including, but not limited to, the following equipment)	Quantity of equipment (quantity of backup)	Total number of breakdown/ damage reports	Major cause of breakdown	Average time taken for repair and putting back into service (working days)	Maximum number of days for repair	Repair and maintenance expenditure	Alternative arrangements during breakdown	Additional daily manpower required during breakdown
2023-2024	(a) Stanley Prison	Security screening and scanning equipment (e.g. X-ray machines, metal detectors)
		Staff handheld device system
		Communications and network equipment (e.g. walkie-talkies, radios)
		Closed-circuit television system
		Video analytics system
		Robotic Monitoring System
		Health monitoring wristbands
	(b)……
	(c)……
2024-2025……
2025-2026……

(4) of the average number of days that the Robotic Monitoring System was used for patrolling and guarding in various institutions in each of the past three financial years; whether CSD has assessed the additional security risks and work pressure posed to the existing establishment (including staff working overtime) in the event of a system breakdown requiring manual operation?
 
Reply:
 
President,
 
     The Correctional Services Department (CSD) is committed to providing a secure, safe, humane, decent and healthy custodial environment for persons in custody (PICs). In recent years, the CSD has been proactively developing Smart Prison through the implementation of innovation and technology strategies to modernise, informatise and humanise management modes and process innovation of correctional institutions, with a view to meeting operational needs while enhancing the efficiency of prison operations, management and rehabilitation work. Moreover, the development of Smart Prison also helps optimise the existing working environment and streamline some of the more cumbersome or physically demanding daily work procedures, thereby ensuring a more humanised and safer environment for correctional officers to perform law enforcement duties.
      
     The reply to the questions raised by the Hon Steven Ho is as follows:
 
(1) The number of admissions to correctional institutions (including convicted persons, remands and detainees) has been on the increase in recent years. The CSD has flexibly deployed the capacity and manpower of individual correctional institutions to cope with the ever-changing penal population. The CSD will continuously review and assess the manpower requirement of each institution based on factors such as PIC population and their categories, security level, institution design and actual operational needs. Through internally re-deploying its resources and capitalising on technology solutions, the CSD will ensure that each institution has sufficient staff to maintain safety and order. To meet the demand for manpower resources for providing quality correctional services, the CSD has adopted various measures to attract and retain talent, with the leveraging of technology as one of the key measures.
 
     Since the breakdown of PIC population, occupancy rate and staff number, etc, by correctional institution involves details of the CSD’s operational and security deployment, such information will not be disclosed. The relevant overall figures/information are provided below:
 
(a) The average daily penal populations and overall occupancy rates of the CSD in the past three financial years are as follows:
 

Financial Year	Average Daily Penal Population	Overall Occupancy Rate (%)
2023-24	8 803	78.0
2024-25	9 755	86.4
2025-26	10 521	94.8

     The numbers of disciplined staff of the CSD (including Officers and Rank and File staff of the CSD, excluding Technical Instructors and Instructors) in the past three financial years are as follows:
 

Financial Year	Officer	Rank and File
2023-24 (as at March 31, 2024)	1 121	4 528
2024-25 (as at March 31, 2025)	1 099	4 555
2025-26 (as at March 31, 2026)	1 118	4 309

(b) The staff establishment of the CSD is not disaggregated by gender. The civil service establishments of the CSD in the past three financial years are set out as follows:
 

Financial Year	Civil Service Establishment
2023-24 (as at March 31, 2024)	7 254
2024-25 (as at March 31, 2025)	7 193
2025-26 (as at March 31, 2026)	7 153

     
     The CSD will enhance efficiency through adoption of measures such as re-prioritising and re-deploying work, flexibly deploying manpower, streamlining work processes and capitalising on technology solutions. For example, the CSD plans to install the Automatic Drone Patrol and Monitoring System 2.0 in six maximum security institutions, which is expected to optimise the prevailing work processes and partly reduce the patrol time of correctional staff, thereby enabling the CSD to deploy manpower more flexibly. While meeting the Government’s goal to streamline the civil service, the CSD will continue to deliver high-quality correctional services and ensure that the security and order of institutions are unaffected.
      
(c) In the past three financial years, frontline staff of the CSD were required to work overtime mainly due to the actual management and operational needs of institutions, such as ad hoc deployment of staff to perform medical escort duties and handle emergencies. The CSD does not maintain statistics on the average monthly overtime hours of frontline staff. The CSD will keep in view the workload of frontline staff and enhance efficiency through adoption of measures such as re-prioritising and re-deploying work, flexibly deploying manpower, streamlining work processes and capitalising on technology solutions based on actual circumstances, so as to reduce overtime work by staff.
 
(d) According to the CSD’s observations and assessments, correctional staff wastage (including transfer to other departments) involves various factors, such as personal career preferences, changes in the economic environment, manpower demands of different sectors or departments, and the unique working environment and special job requirements of correctional institutions. The Department has always attached great importance to staff welfare and treatment, and will continue to adopt a multipronged approach to attract and retain talent. The numbers of disciplined staff of the CSD who transferred to other disciplined services or government departments in the past three financial years are listed as follows:
 

Financial Year	No. of Transferred Staff
	Officer	Rank and File	Total
2023-24	3	34	37
2024-25	0	34	34
2025-26	1	21	22

     The CSD does not maintain a breakdown of the aforementioned transferred staff by gender and years of service.
 
(2) The CSD regularly reviews its recruitment policy, including entry requirements, and adopts a proactive recruitment strategy, so as to attract more applicants.
 
     Having invited a sports medicine expert to review, the CSD has formulated new physical fitness test standards that better meet the daily operational needs of correctional officers nowadays, and has adopted new entry physical fitness test standards since September 16, 2023. Since the adoption of the new entry physical fitness test standards, the overall passing rates of applicants for Officer and Assistant Officer II have increased by approximately 16 percentage points and 30 percentage points respectively.
 
     In addition, regarding the recruitment of Officer this year, students pursuing a bachelor’s degree and graduating by 2028 may receive a conditional offer of employment if they pass the assessment. The recruitment exercise is still in progress, and the CSD will closely monitor the effectiveness of the relevant arrangement.
 
     Among disciplined staff who were recruited between October 1, 2025 and September 30, 2026, the wastage rate (as at September 30, 2026) was 5.8 per cent.
 
(3) In recent years, the CSD has gradually introduced a range of technological equipment into institutions, such as the Video Analytic Monitoring System, Smart Wristbands and the Robotic Monitoring System, to assist frontline staff in their supervision and security duties. As the types and quantities of technological equipment used in various institutions involve details of the institutional security deployment, such information will not be disclosed.
 
     Technological equipment in various institutions occasionally break down due to aging, wear and tear or other reasons. The time required for repairing different equipment is affected by multiple factors, including the specific cause of breakdown or damage as well as whether procurement of related equipment or parts is necessary. Since expenses on repair and maintenance of technological equipment are part of the daily operating expenditures of institutions, no breakdown of such expenses is maintained. During equipment breakdown, contingency arrangements will be implemented based on the specific circumstances, which generally include using backup equipment or assigning duty staff to temporarily perform the relevant tasks, normally without the need for additional manpower.
      
     The CSD will assess the effectiveness of its use of technology by regularly reviewing system operation data, gathering feedback from frontline staff and comparing work processes and efficiency before and after the introduction of the relevant technology. In general, the use of technology helps correctional staff identify abnormal behaviours or physical conditions among PICs at an early stage, enabling prompt intervention. At the same time, it reduces repetitive and physically demanding manual procedures, allowing frontline staff to focus more on supervision and rehabilitation tasks that require professional judgement, thereby enhancing security standards and resource efficiency within institutions. The CSD will continue to review the application of various technologies, as well as optimise and implement relevant technologies in accordance with actual needs.
      
(4) The CSD has set up the Robotic Monitoring System in two correctional institutions. The patrol robots of the system are equipped with multiple cameras and intercommunication functions to assist correctional officers in carrying out night patrol duty and to enhance the monitoring of PICs. Correctional officers can observe prison cells in real time via a tablet computer or a monitor at staff workstations.
 
     The CSD has assessed the relevant impact of possible system breakdown and formulated contingency arrangements. As the system is auxiliary in nature and correctional officers are all along on duty at relevant posts in accordance with established procedures, if a patrol robot breaks down, correctional officers on duty will immediately perform on-site patrol duties in person to maintain institutional security. This generally does not involve extra manpower or overtime work. The CSD does not maintain records of the average number of days per year on which the system was in operation in the past three financial years. read more