• Only go outside for food, health reasons or work (but only if you cannot work from home)
• If you go out, stay 2 metres (6ft) away from other people at all times
• Wash your hands as soon as you get home

Do not meet others, even friends or family.

You can spread the virus even if you don’t have symptoms.

• Only go outside for food, health reasons or work (but only if you cannot work from home)
• If you go out, stay 2 metres (6ft) away from other people at all times
• Wash your hands as soon as you get home

Do not meet others, even friends or family.

You can spread the virus even if you don’t have symptoms.

The independent review into flood insurance announced following the November 2019 flooding in the north of England will be led by the former chair of the Association of British Insurers, Amanda Blanc.

The review was announced by the former Environment Secretary in December and will seek to examine the level of insurance cover held by those affected in Doncaster, the barriers they may have faced in obtaining cover and whether there are any systemic issues in the provision of flood insurance.

Data will be collected through speaking to residents and businesses in the Doncaster area where over 760 properties were reported as having flooded. The River Don recorded its highest ever peak flows at Rotherham and Doncaster on 8 November 2019, with South Yorkshire experiencing its wettest November on record seeing over two and a half times its average rainfall.

The review will provide recommendations that will help enable homes and businesses to access sufficient insurance cover for flooding while also informing any future policy decisions in this area.

Environment Minister Rebecca Pow said:

I’m pleased that the independent review into flood insurance is now underway and I look forward to examining its outcomes in the coming months.

I saw first-hand the awful impact flooding can have on communities across many parts of the country this winter. We want at risk homes and businesses to be able to access sufficient insurance so they have the help they need to get back on their feet as soon as possible after a flood.

Review Chair Amanda Blanc said:

Flooding is a truly devastating event for any householder or business to suffer with consequences that can take many months or even years to overcome. Appropriate and adequate flood insurance can greatly assist with this recovery; helping to get families back into their homes and put businesses back on their feet.

However, for insurance to be effective, all communities, including those most at risk, should consider that flood cover is both available and affordable. I am keen to start work to ascertain if this has been the case in Doncaster under the current system and to make recommendations to ensure the benefits of flood insurance are accessible to all.

The review is set to be completed by the end of September 2020 and the Terms of Reference can be accessed here.

Over 20 million households in the UK have buildings insurance that covers flood risk and the launch of the government and industry initiative Flood Re in 2016 has seen four out of five households with a previous flood claim getting price reductions of more than 50% for their flood insurance.

The conflict in Syria is now in its 10th year. Over half a million Syrians have lost their lives. It has been a brutal experience for the 11 million people who have been displaced. These horrors have been compounded by the repeated use of chemical weapons.

Any use of chemical weapons is a clear breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Outrage at such attacks prompted States Parties to come together in June 2018 and agree that those responsible should be identified.

The report issued by the Director-General of the OPCW on 8 April 2020 responds directly to that tasking. We pay tribute to DG Fernando Arias, and the members of the OPCW’s Investigation and Identification Team led by Santiago Onate.

The report, which examined the chemical weapons attacks in Ltamenah on 24, 25 and 30 March 2017, is meticulously evidence-based. We have full confidence in the Team’s professionalism and the methodologies employed; and therefore in the validity of their findings.

The OPCW’s IIT has concluded that units from the Syrian Arab Air Force were responsible. The Syrian regime has violated the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Sarin is a nerve agent which attacks the central nervous system leading to convulsions, paralysis and asphyxiation. It is totally indiscriminate. The sarin attacks on 24 and 30 March 2017 caused at least 76 casualties.

Parallels between these attacks and the Syrian regime’s use of sarin in Khan Sheikhoun on 4 April 2017 are clear to see. The Assad regime also used sarin as a chemical weapon in 2013, killing hundreds of civilians in Eastern Ghouta.

The report also confirms that chlorine was used as a chemical weapon by the Syrian Arab Air Force on 25 March 2017.

In reaching its conclusions on all three incidents the IIT was unable to identify any other plausible explanation.

• Only Syria operated the aircraft and helicopters used in the attacks.
• Only Syria has the specific munition used in the sarin attacks – and it has failed to account for thousands of these munitions in its Declaration.
• The chemical profile of the sarin used strongly correlated with the precursors and production methods that Syria has declared.
• Syria has failed to account for a significant quantity of the key sarin precursor in its Declaration.

In short, there is no room for any reasonable doubt about Syria’s responsibility for these attacks.

The victims of these attacks deserve justice. We call on the international community to support multilateral mechanisms, including the UN International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism for Syria; as well as national and international prosecutions to ensure accountability for the crimes committed.

On acceding to the Convention in 2013, the Syrian regime made a solemn undertaking to abandon all of its chemical weapons and means of production. It is now indisputable that the Assad regime has kept a secret chemical weapons programme that it has failed to declare.

The regime has tried at every turn to thwart and obstruct the OPCW inspectors; and has spent years denying important aspects of their chemical weapons programme, including developing ricin, nitrogen mustards, soman and lewisite.

The obstruction continues. The regime refused to grant visas to the IIT, breaching its obligations under Article VII of the Convention and UN Security Council Resolution 2118.

Syria is a case unlike any other – a state which is in flagrant and persistent breach of the Convention’s central obligation. Our response in the Executive Council and at the Conference of States Parties needs to reflect that fact.

States Parties must now come together again to defend the taboo against chemical weapons use and demand respect for the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. That is how we will finally consign these appalling weapons to history.

At around 10:57 hrs on 20 March 2020, a northbound train passed a red signal without authority, about 0.75 miles (1.2 km) south of Loughborough station. The train passed the signal, LR507, by around 200 metres. Signal LR507 applies to the down slow line, and was protecting the crossover south of Loughborough station which was set for use by a southbound train calling at the bi-directional, down slow platform 3. The maximum line speed on approach to the signal is 65 mph (104 km/h).

The train was formed of an empty four-car class 710 unit and two class 57 locomotives; one at each end. It was operated by Rail Operations Group (ROG). The class 710 unit was being moved from a testing site at Old Dalby to storage at Worksop. Under these circumstances, a class 710 unit does not run with operational brakes; instead, braking is provided only by the two locomotives, which are connected by a brake pipe which is passed through the carriages of the unit.

The signal on the approach to LR507, LR503, was displaying a single yellow aspect as would be expected. The driver applied the brakes before reaching signal LR507, but the retardation was not sufficient to stop the train from the speed at which it was travelling, before it passed the red signal.

There were no injuries or damage as a consequence of this incident, although the southbound passenger train which was calling at Loughborough station platform 3 at the time of the SPAD incurred a delay of approximately 24 minutes.

Our investigation will seek to establish the sequence of events, including where the train’s brake was applied and at what speed. It will also seek to:

• understand the actions of the people involved
• establish the braking capability of the train and whether it was affected by the way the train was formed, prepared and driven
• review ROG’s processes for producing train timing schedules
• review the industry’s processes for managing the risk of hauling un-braked units
• explore ROG’s arrangements for managing driver competence and fitness and any underlying management factors
• review previous similar accidents and incidents investigated by RAIB and consider the response to recommendations made following those incidents
• make recommendations to prevent a recurrence

Our investigation is independent of any investigation by the railway industry or by the industry’s regulator, the Office of Rail and Road.

We will publish our findings, including any recommendations to improve safety, at the conclusion of our investigation. This report will be available on our website.

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